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Kohla: The Expanded Concept of an Employee's Trade or Business
COMMENTARIES

THE EXPANDED CONCEPT OF AN EMPLOYEE'S
TRADE OR BUSINESS
The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in and directly related to carrying on a trade or business.' In the application of this deduction to individual taxpayers, however,
a disparity has traditionally existed. Although two wage earners may work side
by side at identical tasks, one may be considered an independent contractor
and the other an employee. While the independent contractor may freely
deduct any expense related to his particular skill, the employee may only
deduct expenses related to his existing employment because his trade or
business is coterminative with that employment.
Recently, however, courts have recognized that an employee's occupation
may exist independently of his current employment. This recognition broadens
the scope of the employee's deductible expenses and necessitates a reorientation
of analysis toward employee business deductions. This commentary will examine the development of the expanded concept of an employee's trade or
business and present those factors essential to a contemporary analysis of an
2
employee's trade or business..
TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF AN EMPLOYE's BusiNEss DEDUCTION

The existence of an employee's trade or business deduction was traditionally predicated on the employee's business status being coterminative with his
existing employment. Thus, the employee was "carrying on" a trade or busi4
ness only when actually employed, and the expense related to his business
only when it could be attributed to that same employment.
CarryingOn an Existing Business
While a wage earner's business status was a question of fact based on his

1.

INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, §162 [hereinafter cited as CODE]: TRADE OR BUSINEss Ex-

PrNs s. "(a) IN GENERAL. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... "
2. The ordinary and necessary element of the business deduction is not affected by the
expanded scope of the employee's trade or business. The term "necessary" imposes the minimal requirement that the expense be appropriate and helpful for the development of the
taxpayer's business. The function of the term "ordinary" is to clarify the distinction between
those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital
expenditures. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966). For a discussion of the
theoretical application of these terms see Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and
Necessary" Business Expense, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1089, 1110-15 (1964). For a case analysis
of the use of ordinary and necessary see 4A J. ME__a~s, LAW OF FEDERAL. INcOME TAXATION
§25.09 (J. Malone ed. 1971).
3. CODE §162.
4. Treas. Reg. §1.162-1 (a), T.D. 6690, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 90: "In general. Business
expenses deductible from gross income include the ordinary and necessary expenditures
directly connected with ...

the taxpayer's trade or business ....
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business relationship with his employer, 5 an individual doing his own work
"according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of
his employer" was considered an independent contractor. 6 Since his trade or
business was his productive skill, his business status existed independently
of any particular term of employment. The independent contractor was
always free to deduct, for example, the cost of sharpening his tools or expenses incurred in securing new employment.7
A wage earner, on the other hand, was considered a mere employee when
his employer retained the right to direct the manner in which the work was
to be done as well as the result to be accomplished. 8 Unlike the independent
contractor, his trade or business existed coextensively with each specific term
of employment. Even where the employee performed the same general type of
work for two consecutive employers, his trade or business would still be viewed
as first being an employee of Company A and later of Company B.9 The
statutory condition of "carrying on" presupposed an existing business ° and
the employee had no foundation for a business deduction unless the expense
was incurred while he was employed." Thus, the test for satisfying the "carrying on" condition was whether the expense was incurred while the employee
was actually employed.
The Relation of the Expense to the Employee's Business Status
The Regulations require a direct relation between an expense and the
taxpayer's trade or business.12 Generally, an employee's expenses that related
to securing existing employment were deductible while those related to
seeking new employment were nondeductible. 3 Educational expenses, how-

5. Dowell v. Forrestal, 13 T.C. 845 (1949).
6. Raymond E. Kershner, 14 T.C. 168 (1950).
7. Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 60, 66.
8. Dowell v. Forrestal, 13 T.C. 845, 849 (1949).
9. Thomas W. Ryan, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 580 (1959).
10. Morton L. Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
11. E.g., F. B. Polachek, 22 T.C. 858 (1954); Chester C. Hand, 16 T.C. 1410 (1951);
Raymond L. Collier, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 857 (1954).
12. Treas. Reg. §1.162-1 (a), T.D. 6690, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 90.
13. Fees paid to secure employment were deductible. T.D. 579, 3 CUM. BULL. 130 (1920).
Conversely, expenses incurred in seeking employment were personal and hence, nondeductible.
I.T. 1397, 1-2 CuM. BULL. 145 (1922). However, a viable distinction between seeking and
securing employment never crystalized. See McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944);
Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927). The crux of the problem was that: "While employment agency fees [were) generally paid after employment [had] been secured . . . the obligation to pay such fees . . . [was] incurred when the individual [was] seeking employment.
Therefore . . . fees paid to employment agencies in connection with obtaining employment
[were] also incurred in seeking employment." Rev. Rul. 60-158, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 140, revoked by Rev. Rul. 60-223, 1960-1 Cuss. BULL. 57. Thus, for example, expenses incurred in
defense of a lawsuit that related to the securing of an existing position were deductible. E.g.,
Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310 (1944); A.B. Hurt, 30 B.T.A. 653 (1934); PeoplesPittsburg Trust Co., 21 B.T.A. 588 (1930), aff'd, 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1932). Those incurred
to secure a new position were nondeductible, e.g., Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927);
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ever, were considered intrinsically personal and therefore nondeductible regardless of the relationship of the expense to the employee's trade or business.' 4
This categorical prohibition was overcome in Hill v. Commissioner15 because
petitioner's educational expense was unquestionably related to retaining her
employment.
The petitioner in Hill had been employed as a public school teacher for
twenty-seven years. Although she had reached the highest possible pay scale
and held the highest possible teaching certificate, the school system required a
periodic renewal of her teaching certificate. Petitioner elected to fulfill one
renewal requirement by obtaining three college credits. She subsequently
claimed as a business deduction her tuition, room rent, travel expense, and
the difference between her cost of living at home and at school.' 6 The Tax
Court labeled these expenses as personal, not ordinary and necessary business
expenses, and incurred in order to qualify petitioner for new employment. 17
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed and held that the expenses were deductible: "IT]he attendance at summer school was undertaken essentially to
enable a teacher to continue her . . . career in her . . . existing position."'B
Since a failure to renew the certificate would have resulted in loss of petitioner's teaching position, her educational expenses directly related to maintaining her existing position.'9
The limited scope of deductible educational expenses secured by Hill was
later expanded to include expenses incurred to improve employer related
skills. The petitioner in Coughlin v. Commissioner20 claimed a deduction for
expenses in attending a federal tax institute because he was responsible for
federal tax cases handled by his law firm. The Tax Court distinguished his
expenses from those incurred in Hill on the basis that petitioner did not need
to renew his license and could have continued as a member of his firm without
incurring the expense. 2' The Second Circuit reversed on the theory that he
had a "professional duty to keep sharp the tools he actually used in his going
22
trade or business."

Francois Louis, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1047 (1966); Thomas W. Ryan, 18 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 580 (1959).

14. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (dictum). See also Shaw, Education as
an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in Carrying on a Trade or Business, 19 TAx L. REV. 1
(1964).

15. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
16. Nora Payne Hill, 13 T.C. 291, 292 (1949).
17. Id. at 293-95.

18. 181 F.2d 906, 909 (1950).
19. The Revenue Ruling issued in response to Hill recognized that a teacher's educational expenses might be deductible when those expenses were incurred for the purpose
of maintaining the teacher's position. I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cum. BuLL. 16. This purpose, however, was explidtly distinguished from purposes of "obtaining a teaching position, or
qualifying for permanent status, a higher position, and advance in ... salary schedule, or
to fulfill the general cultural aspirations of the teacher." Id. at 17.
20. 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
21. George G. Coughlin, 18 T.C. 528, 530 (1952).
22. 203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1953).
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The Regulations2 3 responded to Hill and Coughlin by acknowledging as
potential deductions those expenses incurred either to satisfy employer imposed requirements for retention of salary, status, or employment, 2' or to
maintain or improve employer required skills.2

5

A particular deduction was

nevertheless contingent upon showing that the primary purpose for incurring
26
the expense was directly related to the employee's existing employment.
This primary purpose test conceded deductions for cross training in other
basic skills so long as the additional skill directly benefited current employment.2 7 Accountants and Treasury agents, for example, were sometimes able

to deduct the expenses of obtaining a law degree. 2 Conversely, where the
primary purpose was to secure an advancement in position or to fulfill some
personal aspirations, no deduction was allowed because the expense did not
directly relate to the employee's existing trade or business.2 9
EXPANSION OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF AN EMPLOYEE'S
TRADE OR BUSINESS

The recognition that education per se could sustain a business deduction
was inconsistent with the underlying premise that an employee, unlike an
independent contractor, had no significant productive skills. 30 This inconsistency emerged as an exception to the proposition that an employee's business
expense must directly relate to his existing employment.
1967 Education Regulations
The current Regulations3' only deny a deduction for educational expenses
that qualify a taxpayer for a new trade or business.32 No reference is made to
23. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (1958).
24. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (a) (2) (1958).
25. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (a) (1) (1958).
26. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (a) (1958). An employee was not entitled to deduct educational
expenses incurred during a period of unemployment. However, he was not considered to have
ceased to engage in his employment during an off-duty season, while on vacation, or while
on a temporary leave of absence. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69-70.
27. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69, 73.
28. Fortney v. Campbell, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1619 (N.D. Tex. 1964); Welsh v. United
States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), afJ'd, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Walter T.
Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1964). Since the primary purpose test was subjective, for each situation where a deduction was allowed, a deduction in at least one
similar situation was denied. E.g., John W. Williams, Jr., 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 853 (1970);
James J. Engle, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962); James J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1306 (1962).
29. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958). See also Note, Federal Income Taxation-The Ups
and Downs of the Educational Expense Deduction, 41 N.C.L. REv. 827 (1963).
30. See text accompanying notes 5-11 supra.
31. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cus. BULL. 36. The adopted Regulations
were preceded by two sets of proposed regulations. See 31 Fed. Reg. 12,843 (1966); 31 Fed.
Reg. 9276 (1966).
32. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (b)(3), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 36. For purposes of this
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expenses incurred for substantial advancements, new positions, or the acquisition of specialties. Instead, the only condition imposed is that the employee's duties involve the same general type of work before and after
incurring the expense.33 Although the term "same general type of work" is
not defined, it clearly embraces the acquisition of a specialty.3 4 The emphasis
on the type of work performed by the employee rather than the existence of
employment thus increased the scope of the employee's educational deductions.3 s This crucial shift in orientation of the education deduction was not
accompanied, however, by a parallel shift in other areas; thus, the need to
relate the employee's noneducational expenses to existing employment remained unaltered.3 6
Independent Business Status and David J. Primuth
The predicate for the full expansion of the traditional concept of an
employee's business status was set in Harold Haft37 and Furner v. Commissioner..9 The petitioner in Haft was 58 years old and had "spent virtually
his entire adult life in the costume jewelry business."'s While he was described
as an employee, petitioner's employment relationship was more in the nature
of an independent contractor. 40 After losing his job, he incurred expenses in

maintaining contact with his former customers and in seeking a new source
of jewelry. His claim for a business deduction was upheld on the theory that
he "did not cease to be in the costume jewelry business ... merely because
he temporarily had no merchandise to sell."41 Petitioner's long involvement
with costume jewelry sales and his active search for another source of jewelry
to sell are factors indicating a demonstrative commitment to one general
type of work.
commentary, meeting the minimum educational requirements is equivalent to qualification
for a new trade or business. See Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (b) (2), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 36.
33. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (b) (3) (i), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 36.
34. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 36. "Example (4). C,
while engaged in the private practice of psychiatry, undertakes a program of study and
training . . .which will lead to qualifying him to practice psychoanalysis. C's expenditures for such study are deductible because the study and training maintains or improves
skills required by him in his trade or business and does not qualify him for a new trade
or business." Compare Albert C. Ruehmann, III, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 71,157 (1971), with
Johnson v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. §f9847 (E.D. La. 1971) (dictum).
35. See Niswander, Tax Aspects of Education: When Ordinary and Necessary; When
Personal,N.Y.U. 26TH INsT. ON FEn. TAx 27 (1968).

86. E.g., David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970) (dissenting opinions); Eugene A. Carter,
51 T.C. 932 (1969); CJ. Morris, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1296 (1967), afj'd, 423 F.2d 611
(9th Cir. 1970).
37. 40 T.C. 2 (1963).
38. 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), revg Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
39. 40 T.C. 2, 5 (1963).
40. Petitioner sold his employer's costume jewelry products in his own territory to his
own customers and was compensated primarily on a commission basis. The Tax Court in
a subsequent case described him as "a commission salesman temporarily out of work."
Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932, 936 (1969).
41. 40 T.C. 2, 6 (1963).
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In Furner v. Commissioner42 the petitioner also claimed a deduction for
expenses incurred while unemployed; she had majored in social studies and
subsequently was employed as a social studies teacher. This employment was
later terminated for one year to obtain a graduate degree in social studies.
Her subsequent reemployment as a social studies teacher demonstrated a commitment to one general type of work. Although she incurred her graduate
school expenses at a time when she was neither actually employed nor on
leave from her previous employer, 43 she claimed her expenses as a business
deduction. The Commissioner's objection to this claim eventually focused
only on the leave of absence status.44 Since petitioner's former employer did
not grant leave to its teachers, the Seventh Circuit considered leave status in
that instance to have little meaning as a criterion for deductibility and hence
granted the deduction.

45

Haft and Furner both involved employees who had demonstrated a commitment to one general type of work and had deducted expenses related to
that work while unemployed. That common element emerged in the landmark decision in David J. Primuth- as the foundation for a fundamental expansion in the concept of an employee's trade or business.
The petitioner in Primuth had been employed for six years as the company's secretary-treasurer. With the help of an employment agency he then
became comptroller and assistant to the vice president of finance with another
firm. Although no higher or different qualifications were required in this
change of employment, petitioner had changed his trade or business under the
traditional concept.4 7 Consequently, the Commissioner argued that the employment agency fee was nondeductible because it was not related to the petitioner's existing employment.48 The court, however, relied upon Haft and
Furner: "[A]n employee [may] retain, at least temporarily, his status of carrying on his own trade or business independent of receiving any compensation
from a particular employer." 49 The petitioner simply had ceased to be an
executive for one company on Friday and had become an executive for another on Monday. The deduction was allowed because petitioner was in the
trade or business of being a corporate executive. 50 His business status for tax
purposes was, in short, independent of his actual employment with either
company.
42. 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'g Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
43. A temporary leave of absence is sufficient to sustain a business deduction. Rev.
Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 69, 70.
44. 393 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1968).
45. Id. at 295.
46. 54 T.C. 374 (1970). For a discussion for the effect of this decision on employment-seeking expenses see Note, Expenses Incurred in Seeking Employment - The Tax
Court Opens the Door to Deductibility, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 468.
47. 54 T.C. 374, 384 (1970) (dissenting opinions).
48.

Id.

49. Id. at 378.
50. Id. at 379. Petitioner was also categorized as a financial corporate executive, id. at
382 (concurring opinion), and as a mere employee of the initial company, id. at 384 (dissenting opinion).
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This potential for independent business status postulated in Primuth
expanded the traditional concept of an employee's trade or business51 by emphasizing those factors, as in Haft and Furner, which demonstrate the employee's commitment to one general type of work.
CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE

BUSINESS

DEDUCTIONS

The recognition in Primuth of an employee's potential for carrying on
a trade or business independent of existing employment has compelled a
new perspective toward employee business deductions. While no independent
business status can exist absent prior employment in one general type of
work, 52 where there is prior employment in a particular type of work the
employee's business deduction must be analyzed according to his demonstrated
commitment to that type of work. Certain positive and negative factors form
the matrix of that analysis.
Positive Factors
The length of time employed in the same general type of work is indicative of the employee's commitment to that work. By devoting his entire adult
life to the selling of costume jewelry, the petitioner in Harold Haft53 had
clearly demonstrated a strong commitment to the jewelry business. The time
span, however, does not necessarily have to indicate the permanent undertaking or lifework connotation present in the term "career." The petitioner
in Furner v. Commissioner54 had only taught school for three years. Conceivably, the requisite commitment may be found in even shorter periods.
In Barry Reisine95 the petitioner had been employed for nearly a year as
an engineer before voluntarily terminating his employment to seek additional
education. His subsequent claim for an educational expense deduction was
denied because he had failed to establish himself in the trade or business of
being an engineer.5 6 While this indicates that employment of one year or less
may be insufficient to demonstrate a commitment to one general type of work,
the presence of two negative factors makes this indication inconclusive.
First, the petitioner testified he had contemplated terminating his employment only a couple of months after commencing work. 57 This suggested a commitment to education, not to business. Second, he did not seek
reemployment in the same general type of work but remained in school as a

51. E.g., Guy R. Motto, 54 T.C. 558 (1970); Albert C. Ruehmann, III, P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. U71,157 (1971); W. Richard Gerhard, 29 CCi Tax Ct. Mem. 1153 (1970).
52. Compare James Davis Protiva, 1970 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1491, with Robert F. Casey,
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. %71,012 (1971).
53. 40 T.C. 2 (1963).
54. 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'g Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
55. 29 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1429 (1970).
56. Id. at 1430.
57. Id. at 1429.
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full-time student. 58 These two factors have a distinctly negative effect on the
development of any demonstrative commitment. Consequently, an employment period of one year or less cannot automatically be interpreted as insufficient to establish an independent business status.
The effort expended by a former employee in seeking reemployment in the
same general type of work is another positive factor. While a high degree
of seeking activity was present in Harold Haft59 the case of Walter W. Hendrix, Jr.60 indicates that under some circumstances a minimal reemployment
effort may be acceptable.
The petitioner in Hendrix had been employed as a salesman for eight
years. After being discharged by his employer he made some unsuccessful
preliminary efforts to locate products to sell. Coincident with his wife's
summer vacation he and his wife embarked on a three month product-seeking
expedition to "those parts of Europe of most interest to tourists .... .61
The petitioner was unsuccessful in locating any products and could only document his expenses for three days of the entire three months. Moreover, after
returning from Europe he terminated his search for employment and devoted his time to building apartments. Nevertheless, his seeking activity was
sufficient to sustain a business deduction for his airfare to Europe. 2 This
minimal standard does not appear to apply, however, where education is involved.
In Don Cornish6 3 the petitioner had been employed in technical or scientific trade for twenty years but had become a full-time student after being released from his position. After earning an undergraduate degree and working
briefly toward a graduate degree, he withdrew from school to seek reemployment. When his efforts proved unsuccessful, he resumed his status as a
full-time student.
*While acknowledging petitioner's seeking efforts as evidence that he was
still in the business of being a physicist,6 4 the court weighed that evidence
against testimony that he sought reemployment only because of financial and
family pressures. Consequently, the court viewed his seeking "more as an
aberration in his educational pursuits than as proof of a trade or business
with educational pursuits merely ancillary thereto."6 5 The court appeared
to weigh petitioner's lack of success against his motives for seeking reemployment. This motivational element clearly was not present in Hendrix.66 It
indicates that a higher standard of seeking may be applied where the em58. Id. Where a taxpayer ceases to be employed for a period in excess of one year,
educational expenses incurred during the entire period will not be recognized. Rev. Rul.
68-591,
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

1968-2 Cum. BULL 73.
40 T.C. 2 (1963).
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 171,049 (1971).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 236.
29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 235 (1970).
Id. at 238.
Id.
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f71,049 (1971).
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ployee initially elects to become a fMil-time student.
Although educational background as a factor is not considered in existing
cases, it may contribute to a demonstrative commitment to one general type

of work. The petitioner in Furner,67 for example, had majored in social

studies, taught social studies, and taken her advanced degree in social studies.

Thus, her commitment to teaching social studies was amplified by this background.
Negative Factors

Continued enrollment as a full-time student tends to demonstrate a
commitment to education and not to a trade or business. 8 Although the negative effect of this factor might conceivably be overcome by a strong seeking
element, an extended educational break from employment will generally preclude a deduction.
An employee may have more than one trade or business.6 9 A salesman,
for example, may also be in the business of owning and renting apartments.7 0
When his job as a salesman is terminated his status as a salesman is not
automatically extinguished by the existence of his apartment business, and
his salesman status may be sustained through the positive element of seeking
new items to sell. Apparently, a sufficient seeking factor could sustain an
independent business status even after an employee is compelled to find
employment in another general type of work. The effect of the subsequent
employment may depend on the amount of income derived from the employment. Where it is insignificant, the other employment should not be
considered.1 On the other hand, foregoing employment in a claimed trade or
business and accepting work in other areas demonstrates a lack of commitment to the claimed trade which would be difficult to overcome. 2
While involuntary separation can be considered an essentially neutral factor,73 voluntary termination of prior employment may demonstrate a lack
of commitment to that type of work. In Barry Reisine74 petitioner's one year
as an engineer was minimized because he voluntarily terminated his employment. This voluntariness brought into issue the point in time when he first
considered returning to school. Testimony that this point was shortly after
beginning work strongly indicated that his commitment was to education, not
business. Voluntary termination for other personal reasons can have a similar
51
effect.7
67. 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'g Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
68. Barry Reisine, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1429 (1970); Don Cornish, 29 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 235 (1970). See also Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 78.

69. L.T. Alverson, 35 B.T.A. 482, 488 (1937).
70. Walter W. Hendrix, Jr., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 171,049 (1971).
71. See Don Cornish, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 235 (1970).
72. See Don E. Wyatt, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 156A0 (1971); Peter G. Corbett, P-H Tax Ct.
Rep. ff55.89 (1971).
73. Cf. Walter W. Hendrix, Jr., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 171,049 (1971).
74. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1429 (1970).
75. Cf. Peter G. Corbett, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 55.89 (1971).
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Regardless of the weakness of negative factors or the strength of positive
ones, an employee's independent business status cannot last for more than a
temporary period.7 6 "Temporary" as used elsewhere in tax law denotes a
definite period of less than one year. 7 A similar interpretation has attached
to the issue of an employee's independent business status. The Commissioner
has expressly attempted to limit an educational leave to one year.78 Unemployed individuals have been accorded a reasonable period in which to reestablish themselves in their former trade;79 however, this period has not
extended beyond one year.80
Relation of the Expense to the Employee's Business Status
Having recognized that an employee may have a business status independent of existing employment, the courts have been more willing to retreat from the direct relation requirement imposed by the Regulations. s A
proximate relation between the expense and the employee's business status
may now suffice.
In Kenneth R. Kenfields2 an employment agency had successfully secured
a new job offer for petitioner. Petitioner's old employer, however, induced him
to remain by offering him an increase in salary and position. Although petitioner declined the new job offer, he claimed the agency fee as a business deduction. Since the old employer had no knowledge of the employment agency,
the Commissioner contended no direct relationship existed between the
fee and the promotion and denied petitioner's claim. This contention was
rejected, however, because the court considered the promotion a "direct
83
consequence" of the job offer secured by the agency.

76. David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 878 (1970).
77. See Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 60. Compare J.P Selby, 14 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 17 (1955), with Wesley H. Harrington, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 436 (1953).
78. Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 GUM. BULL. 73. "The Service will follow the Furner decision . .. where the facts are substantially the same as those in the Furner case, that is,
where a taxpayer, in order to undertake education or training to maintain or improve skills
required in his employment or other trade or business, temporarily ceases to engage actively
in employment or other trade or business. Ordinarily, a suspension for a period of a
year or less, after which the taxpayer resumes the same employment or trade or business,
will be considered temporary."
79. Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963). "[W]here petitioner was actively seeking a suitable
connection commensurate with his status in the costume jewelry field, we think that the
period of transition was a reasonable one." Id. at 6.
80. Walter W. Hendrix, Jr., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f71,049 (1971). "[I]t cannot be said ...
that the calendar year 1967 was not a reasonable period of transition." Id. at 235.
81. Treas. Reg. §1.162-I (a), T.D. 6690, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 90. The Commissioner has
not joined in this retreat. Cf. Rev. Rul. 70-396, 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 31, at 13; Rev. Rul.
71-308, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 82. Retreat is also unlikely where the direct relation
requirement is imposed by statute. See CODE §274: DISAL.OWANCE OF CERTAIN ENTERTAINMENT
EXPENSES.

82. 54 T.C. 1197 (1970).
83. Id. at 1200.
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Gale Carlisle Huber 4 indicates a further retreat from the direct relation
requirement. Petitioner claimed a deduction for employment agency fees.
Although the agency assisted petitioner in preparing his resum6 and counseled him regarding his employment interviews, the agency never had any
direct contact with the company that hired the petitioner. As the agency had
never contacted the new employer, the Commissioner contended that the
85
fee was not directly related to petitioner's trade or business. The court
categorically rejected the contention that the deduction was contingent on the
86
agency being directly responsible for procuring the new job: "All the service
can do is present its client in a favorable way, and instruct him in the most
effective methods of job seeking." The material assistance rendered by the
agency was considered sufficiently related to petitioner's trade or business
87
to sustain the deduction.
The introduction of the expanded concept of an employee's trade or
business necessitated the adoption of the proximate relation test. Unlike the
rigid direct relation requirement, this test can be responsive to the relative
strength of the employee's demonstrative commitment. Consequently, the
strength of this commitment can increase the latitude allowed between the
expense incurred and the employee's trade or business.
The petitioner in Maurice Artstein,88 for example, had, during a twentyfive year period, "established a reputation in the shoe industry as a stylist
and salesman."'8 9 He had made a loan to his financially troubled employer to
insure production of shoes that he personally had designed and sold. When
the loan became uncollectable, petitioner claimed a business bad debt deduction. The Commissioner argued that the loan was nondeductible because it
was not made to secure his job.90 Instead of responding to this argument, petitioner asserted that the expense was incurred "to maintain his standing,
position, reputation, and employability in general as a designer and
salesman of shoes." '91 Although a more precise relationship between the expense and his trade was never established, the court allowed the deduction.
This latitude in proximate relation may have been accepted in response to
to factors demonstrating petitioner's strong commitment to his business of
designing and selling shoes.
The proximate relation test does not operate with respect to educational
expenses. Although the Regulations 92 foreshadowed the expanded concept of
an employee's trade or business, they point out two classes of expenses that
84. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Afem. 958 (1970). For an expanded discussion of this decision see
Tucker, An Individual's Employment-Seeking Expenses: Analyzing the New judicial Climate,
54 J. TAXATION 352 (1971).
85. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 958, 961 (1970).
86. Id.
87. Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

29 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 961 (1970).
Id. at 965.
Id. at 964.

Id. at 965.
Treas. Reg. §1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cum. BuLL. 36.
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are explicitly nondeductible: those incurred to meet minimum educational
requirements of a trade or business93 and those incurred to qualify in a new
trade or business.9 4 Furthermore, these expenses remain nondeductible even
though the education maintains or improves employment-required skills. 95
Courts also appear reluctant to allow a business deduction to a few individuals for educational expenses that to the majority are personal. 96 College level courses purportedly taken to maintain or improve employerrequired skills must have a "substantial relationship" to those skillsY 7 Catalogue course descriptions may be analyzed against the employee's own job
description.98 Where the employee is engaged in a program leading to an
undergraduate degree, his expenses may be allocated between those that bear
a direct relation to his work and those that generally increase his competency
and understanding.9- This reluctance to allow a business deduction for educational courses generally beneficial and the specific restrictions in the Regulations make unlikely the emergence of a responsive proximate relation with
respect to educational expenses.
CONCLUSION

The traditional analysis of an employee's trade or business deduction
conceptually viewed an employee's business status as coterminative with his
existing employment. The result was a mechanical application of the provisions of the Code and Regulations:
(1) Was the employee employed at the time the expense was incurred?
(2) Did the expense directly relate to that existing employment?
The recent expansion of the employee business concept has necessitated
a reorientation of the analysis of employee business deductions. This reorientation is predicated on the potential for an employee to carry on a business
status independently of existing employment. Consequently, the contemporary analysis involves a more subjective application of the Code and Regulations:

93. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (b) (2), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 86. But see Rev. Rul. 71-58,
1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 6, at 6.
94. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (b) (3), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 36.
95. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (b) (1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cum. BULL 36.
96. Cf. William M. Kinch, CCH TAX CT. RFP. Dec. No. 80,794 (m) (1971).
97. Daniel J. Coughlin, III, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 459 (1969).
98. Id. at 460-62.
99. Carroll v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1969). Courses that the Commissioner suggested might relate to a policeman's trade or business were: police-community
relations, urban sociology, social psychology, or constitutional rights of criminal suspects.
Id. at 95 n.9. A slightly more flexible attitude is apparent with respect to advanced education.
See Walter G. Lage, 52 T.C. 130 (1969); Rev. Rul. 69-199, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 51.
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(1) Are factors present that demonstrate the employee's commitment
to employment in one general type of work?
(2) Are those factors sufficient to outweigh any lack of proximity the
expense may have with respect to the employee's business status?
This contemporary analysis does not automatically preclude deductions for
expenses incurred to improve the employee's position or to seek reemployment. Business status is now approached more generically with the emphasis on type of employment rather than on employer. Thus, recognition that
an employee may carry on a business status independent of existing employment makes the employee's business deduction more responsive to business
realities.
Although all employees will conceivably benefit from this expanded concept and the concomitant deductions, the most noticeable beneficiaries are the
unemployed because termination of employment no longer automatically
terminates business status. Nevertheless, the expanded concept cannot be construed as creating a business status absent some commitment to one general
type of work.
The fundamental requirement that the employee demonstrate a commitment to one general type of work in order to achieve independent business status cannot be overemphasized. This commitment may be shown
through either existing employment or prior employment patterns. An individual, no matter how well trained for one general type of work, has no business status until he first has been employed in that general type of work.
Moreover, an individual previously employed in a number of general types
of work is unlikely to have a trade or business status absent existing employment. Although the traditional requirement of existing employment has been
abrogated, employment - past or present - remains the key to an employee's
trade or business deduction.
DONALD
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